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INTERPRETATION OF THE PACIFIST ARTICLE OF 
THE CONSTITUTION BY THE BUREAU OF CABINET 
LEGISLATION: A NEW SOURCE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW? 
 
Hajime Yamamoto
Abstract: This article analyzes recent change of Japanese governmental 
interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan concerning the right of collective 
self-defense. This governmental interpretation of Article 9 has been elaborated by the 
Bureau of Cabinet Legislation. This article criticizes a recent critique of this situation 
by main stream Japanese constitutional scholars as “crisis of constitutionalism”.
I. INTRODUCTION
 
Since the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP’s) landslide victory in 
the general election in December 2012 and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 
return to office, Abe, the leader of the LDP, has been under critical fire 
from the media and many constitutional scholars on grounds of violations 
of the principle of constitutionalism. These critics proclaim that we are 
under a crisis of constitutionalism.1 Indeed, Abe, who had served 
previously as Prime Minster from 2006 to 2007, was well known as a 
fervent advocate of constitutional reformation. Once he became Prime 
Minister for the second time in December 2012, he soon proposed a 
revision of the constitutional amendment procedure stipulated by Article 
96 of the Japanese Constitution.2 He argued that the current 
requirements for a constitutional amendment—the approval of two thirds 
of the members in both houses of the Diet plus a majority of votes cast in 
a mandatory national referendum—were too strict to allow the Japanese 
constitution to conform to changes in circumstances. He proposed to 
relax the requirement of Article 96 such that a constitutional amendment 
would require approval by a simple majority vote of members of each 
House, instead of two thirds of members, while retaining the mandatory 
 Professor, Keio University School of Law. 
1 See generally Yasuo Hasebe, The End of Constitutional Pacifism?, 26.1 WASH. INT’L L.J. 125
(2016). 
2 NIHONKOKU KENPƿ [K(13ƿ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 96, para. 1–2 (Japan) (“Amendments to 
this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all 
the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall 
require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such 
election as the Diet shall specify.  Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by 
the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution.”).
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national referendum. This proposal succeeded to impress his very 
positive attitude for his supporters. However, Abe’s proposal failed to
advance because the opposition parties and public opinion criticized it 
harshly arguing that it would mean a substantial negation of the written 
and rigid constitution of Japan. Thus he was forced to withdraw the
proposal.3
After the general election in 2012, Abe also led LDP in 
overwhelming victories in two successive national elections, the House of 
Councillors in July 2013 and the general election of the House of 
Representatives in December 2014. Now, the ruling coalition of the 
LDP and Komeito (a Buddhist center-right party) have 326 seats out of 
475 (68.6%) in the House of Representatives and the Abe Cabinet 
continues to be relatively popular as compared with most predecessors
(for example 46.0% positive opinions by an NHK poll in December
2015).4
Despite the LDP’s large legislative majority and general 
popularity, Abe realized that it was politically impossible to pass an 
amendment pursuant to Article 96 that would change the text of Article 9, 
the pacifist article of the Japanese Constitution. Even if he could pass 
the amendment through both houses of Parliament, it was not possible to 
predict the outcome of the mandatory national referendum that would 
follow.
To achieve changes to the constitution, Abe modified his strategy.
Aware of it being politically impossible to pass an amendment pursuant 
to Article 96 that would change the text of Article 9, he instead attempted 
to alter the long-standing governmental interpretation of Article 9.
According to the governmental interpretation prepared by the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) and presented for the first time in 
1972 to the House of Councillors’ Audit Committee as an answer to a 
question posed by a Councillors, Article 9 of the Constitution prohibits 
Japan from exercising the right of collective self-defense recognized by 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, although Japan may individually exercise 
3 However, many constitutional scholars have argued that theoretically such a reform does not 
violate a substantial limit upon constitutional amendment. See, e.g., NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE (supplanted 
by Kazuyuki Takahashi), KENPO [Constitutional Law] (Iwanami Shoten ed., 6th ed. 2015) (arguing that 
theoretically such a reform does not violate a substantial limit upon constitutional amendment). See 
generally SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS, 260–61 (2011).
4 Seiji Yishiki Getsurei Chousa [Monthly research on political consciousness], NHK ONLINE,
https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/yoron/political/2015.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2016) (showing the 
results of a monthly research of political opinion by Japan’s national broadcaster). 
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the right of self-defense.5 On July 1st 2014, the Abe Cabinet announced 
that it had decided to change this long-standing constitutional 
interpretation in order to allow Japan constitutionally to exercise the right 
of collective self-defense under certain conditions.6 This decision 
caused a very heated dispute, in both political and academic circles.
Abe, this time as “the reformer of constitutional interpretation,” became 
the target of criticism as a promoter of “destruction of 
constitutionalism.”7
I would like to take the opportunity to examine Japanese 
constitutional theory in light of this political-constitutional controversy. 
In Section II, I will present briefly the political background of Abe
Cabinet’s decision. In Section III, I will focus on the legal background 
and analyze the debate on the constitutionality of the self-defense army 
and role of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. In Section IV, I will present 
a recent change of Japanese governmental interpretation of Article 9 of 
the Constitution concerning the right of collective self-defense. To 
reflect theoretically this change of interpretation, I will examine whether 
the interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution by the CLB is 
a new source of constitutional law, and, if so, what place would be 
occupied by this new source of law in the hierarchy of norms in Japan?
In the Conclusion, I will mention how we should reconstruct the
normativity of Article 9.
II. POLITICAL BACKGROUND8
A. Evolution of the Political Situation on Constitutional Revision
 
The acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration of August 14th, 1945 
demanding unconditional surrender forced the Japanese Empire to make 
liberal and democratic reforms. While the occupying US forces carried 
out these reforms in various fields, one natural and inevitable 
consequence of the imposed reforms was establishment of a new 
democratic and liberal constitution. The Japanese government desired 
5 Ichiro Yoshikuni, Director General, Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Answer before the Cabinet 
Committee of the House of Councillors (May 12, 1972). All answers of governmental officials in this 
article are author’s translation from Japanese into English. 
6 Kakugi Kettei: Kunino sonritsu wo matto shi, Kokumin wo mamoru tameno kiremenonai 
anzenhosho hosei no seibi ni tsuite, [Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to 
Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People] PRIME MINISTER AND HIS CABINET (July 1, 2014),
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/decisions/2014/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2014/07/03/anpohosei_eng.pdf.
7 Renhǀ Murata, President of the Democratic Party, Question posed to House of Councillors 
(Feb. 24, 2014).
8 See CURTIS J. MILHAUPT, J. MAR RAMSEYER & MARK D. WEST, THE JAPANESE LEGAL 
SYSTEM: CASES, CODES, AND COMMENTARY 214–28 (2d ed. 2012).
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only a “slight touch,” or in other words, only minor changes to the 
Imperial Charter of 1889.9 Therefore, it accepted only very reluctantly, 
under pressure from the occupation forces, the proposal to establish a 
completely new constitution.10 In the end, however, the government and 
the members of the Diet adopted by an overwhelming majority an only 
slightly retouched version of the draft presented by General MacArthur.
Following Japan's recovery of its independence in 1952 with the 
ratification of the Treaty of San Francisco, a conservative camp quickly 
formed that held a long-cherished wish to establish a new constitution 
which would reinforce the status of the Emperor, modify the pacifist 
clause to admit rearmament, and give extensive power to the State so as 
to limit citizens’ exercise of liberties and rights.11 This group’s main 
complaint concerned Article 9, the pacifist clause that prevented a 
remilitarization of Japan. They preferred a new reactionary and 
authoritarian autonomous constitution, much more suited to the structure 
of traditional Japanese society. The conservative camp will be unified 
in 1955 as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). 
Despite the LDP remaining in power almost continuously from 
1955 until now, the Japanese Constitution has yet to be modified. This 
is due to efforts by progressives to prevent constitutional revision and
block the realization of the wishes of ultra conservative elements within 
the LDP. Japanese left-wing parties, including the Japanese Socialist 
Party (JSP) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) considered the 
liberal and democratic constitution to be a symbol and an indispensable 
instrument of the radical democratization of Japanese post-war society.
The pacifist Article was also the central Article of this Constitution.
The Japanese left-wing parties, more or less favorable toward communist 
countries, wanted an unarmed and neutral Archipelago so that Japan
would not do military collaboration with the U.S. as a member of the 
Western countries under the Cold War. Therefore, supporters of 
constitutional reform were paradoxically considered conservatives in the 
political sense (Hoshu), while pro-constitution activists were considered
progressives (Kakushin) in the same sense. After a failed attempt by the 
Conservative government to achieve an authoritarian constitutional 
9 See RYUSUKE ISHII, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN JAPAN 112 (1989); EDWIN O.
REISCHAUER, JAPAN: THE STORY OF A NATION 116 (4th ed. 2004); KAZUHIRO TAKII, THE MEIJI 
CONSTITUTION (David Noble ed. & trans., 2007). 
10 See generally SHOICHI KOSEKI, THE BIRTH OF JAPANS POSTWAR CONSTITUTION (Ray A. Moore 
ed. 1998); THEODORE MCNELLY, THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN’S DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2000); A.
MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNER FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING THE NEW JAPANESE STATE 
UNDER MACARTHUR (2002).
11 See generally SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 3, at 262.
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reform in 1956, reform movements gradually subsided, and the text of the 
Constitution was never revised.
However, the atmosphere toward constitutional revision in Japan 
has grown more favorable since the 1990s in the global changes of 
politics and economy.12 This is mainly a result of upheaval in Japan's 
international environment. The Cold War ended definitively, while new 
regional and ethnic conflicts have exploded around the world. As part 
of this “New World Order,” Japan has been forced to assume its
international responsibilities under external pressures. The decisive 
event was the First Gulf War, where the United States pressured Japan to
contribute beyond the dimension of “checkbook diplomacy.”13
Conservative reformers (Hoshu), LDP members, also have managed to 
influence opinion by putting forward proposed constitutional reforms 
concerning environmental protection, transparency of information and 
decentralization. Furthermore, in 2012, the LDP published a very 
conservative draft for a comprehensive amendment of the present 
Constitution.14 We can consider this draft as a result of a kind of 
socio-psychological reaction to development of globalization of Japanese 
society in order to emphasize a Japanese identity against such a 
world-wide trend.
In July 2016, the election of the House of Councillors was held. 
The LDP/Komeito coalition scored a sweeping victory in spite of a 
well-organized election campaign by opposition parties, including the 
Japan Communist Party. As a result, the coalition parties and revisionist 
opposition parties have gained a two-thirds supermajority in the Upper 
House. This enables the parties to initiate a referendum on changes to 
the Constitution because they already have a two-thirds supermajority in 
the House of Representatives. However, according to a recent public 
opinion poll by the Nikkei newspaper, even after the victory of the Abe 
Administration in the election of the Upper House, opinion supporting 
activities of the Abe Administration to realize a constitutional amendment 
decreased from 38% in January to 46% in July and opposite opinion 
12 See generally J. PATRICK BOYD & RICHARD J. SAMUELS, NINE LIVES?: THE POLITICS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN JAPAN 27 (2005).
13 “Checkbook diplomacy” means a diplomatic policy that uses economic aid between countries 
to gain diplomatic favor.
14 Jiyumintô, Shinkenpô sôan [New Draft Constitution], Oct. 28, 2005, at 
www.jimin.jp/jimin/shin_kenpou/shiryou/pdf/051028_a.pdf [hereinafter LDP Draft].
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increased respectively from 34% to 49%.15 Thus, the prospect for a 
constitutional amendment in the near future is quite uncertain.
B. Constitutional Pacifism and Contradictory Military Reality16
 
The Constitution proclaims a remarkable pacifism. First, the 
Japanese people renounce all kinds of war, including defensive war;
second, it is interpreted as completely disarming the country; and finally, 
“the right to live in peace” is proclaimed in the Preamble and Article 9 of 
the Constitution. Chapter II of the Constitution provides as follows:
CHAPTER II RENUNCIATION OF WAR
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based 
on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war 
as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force 
as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, 
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized.17
This text is not merely the result of a victory of an idealistic 
pacifism. Indeed, a complex political situation immediately following 
the end of World War II led Japan to proclaim such pacifism. The aim 
of the Allied Powers of total disarmament policy of Japan was to 
condemn it as pre-war colonialist and imperialistic invader. The 
Japanese government agreed to disarmament because preservation of the 
imperial regime and the national polity was the most important support 
for traditional social and moral order in Japanese society.18 The 
government therefore wished to save the imperial regime at any cost;
total disarmament was the price. The Japanese had also lived through
“Hiroshima and Nagasaki” and experienced the first hand misery and 
15 Abe Seiken Deno Kenpou Kaisei “Hantai” 49% Yoronchousa [49% “Disagrees” to the 
Constitutional Reform under Abe Administration: Public Opinion Poll], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN (July 
25, 2016), http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLZO05207340V20C16A7PE8000/.
16 See generally JAMES E. AUER, ‘ARTICLE NINE: RENUNCIATION OF WAR’ IN JAPANESE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 69 (Percy R. Luney, Jr., & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993); TOSHIHIRO 
YAMAUCHI, ‘CONSTITUTIONAL PACFISM: PRINCIPLE, REALITY, AND PERSPECTIVE’ IN FIVE DECADES OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPANESE SOCIETY 27 (Yoichi Higuchi ed., 2001); BOYD & SAMUELS, supra
note 12; MCNELLY, supra note 10 at 105; GLENN D. HOCK & GAVAN MCCORMACK, JAPAN’S
CONTESTED CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS 13 (2001).
17 K(13ƿ, art. 9, para. 2 (Japan).
18 See SHOICHI KOSEKI, supra note 10, at 102.
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inhumanity of war. The phrase “the war, that's enough!” represented the 
general feeling at the time.
However, from the very early stage of the Cold War, Americans 
began to regret bitterly the introduction of Article 9 in the Constitution. 
Only a few years after the defeat of Japan, tensions between the US and 
the USSR became more prominent. The emergence of the Chinese 
Communist government in 1949 finally convinced the United States that 
Japan’s assistance was necessary to counter communist influence in Asia. 
The Cold War strongly shook Japan's new constitutional era.
Consequently, U.S. diplomatic policy changed course.19 In 1950, 
General MacArthur ordered the Tokyo government to create a 
paramilitary force to take over the role of American troops in Japan.
When the troops shift from Japan to the Korean Peninsula, Japan would 
become defenseless. In fact, the Cold War led the Japanese and the U.S. 
to question the disarmament provision in the Japanese Constitution very 
seriously. 
By November 1948, the US and Japanese governments had already 
developed a potential solution to address the constitutional problem 
relating to Article 9. According to the new idea, the text of Article 9 
prohibited “the use of force as means of settling international disputes”,
but did not prohibit the use of force as a means to defend the national 
territory, a right recognized by all nations under the UN Charter.20 The 
United States therefore proposed the creation of a paramilitary force. 
Thus, Japan was encouraged to build the embryo of an army. The 
American aim was twofold: reduce the cost of defense of the 
Archipelago, and allow it to accomplish a remilitarization through new 
alliances despite active protest movements.
In 1951, a “National Police Reserve (Keisatsu Yobitai)” of 75,000 
men was created. That same year, Japan signed the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, allowing it to rejoin the international community. Japan also 
signed the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which legitimized the continued 
presence of the US Army garrison in Japanese territory after the end of 
the post-War occupation. The paramilitary force changed its name 
twice: first, it became the “National Security Force (Hoantai)” in 1952,
and then the “Self-Defense Forces” (Jieitai or “SDF”) in 1954. Since 
that time, the Japanese army has gradually strengthened its military 
19 See generally MARIUS B. JANSEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN 969 (2000); REISCHAUER,
supra note 9, at 199.
20 See MCNELLY, supra note 10, at 134–35. 
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relationship with US forces. Today, the National Defense budget (for 
FY2015) is $40.9 billion in US dollars, an amount similar to that of 
France ($50.9 billion) or Germany ($39.4 billion).21
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Debate on the Constitutionality of the Self-Defense Army
 
Due to Article 9 of the Constitution, the constitutionality of the 
SDF has been an important ongoing legal issue in Japan since World War
II. The issue of national defense and the creation of an army in relation 
to constitutionalism is particularly interesting in this country compared to
other countries. In Japan, discussion about the army is directly related 
to constitutional matters. While the SDF has developed considerably 
throughout the postwar period, the legal debate about its constitutionality 
has never really ceased.
Successive governments have argued that even under Article 9 of 
the Constitution, Japan is not prohibited from possessing a “minimum 
defensive force necessary for its self-defense”.22 According to this 
constitutional interpretation, if Japan were to have a military force 
beyond that minimum level, however, the situation would become
unconstitutional because it would amount to “war potential” prohibited 
by Article 9 of the Constitution. Therefore, the successive governments
have taken the view that the military power of the SDF does not reach the 
level of such “war potential”. In Parliament, the ruling party, LDP, has 
supported the government's interpretation in the domain of national 
defense despite strong protest from the Japanese left wing. For many 
years, however, the left-wing parties succeeded in slowing a gradual 
expansion of the SDF politically through parliamentary debates. But in 
1994, the Japanese Socialist Party made a change in its policy toward 
Article 9 to join a ruling coalition. As a consequence, all Japanese
political parties have come to recognize the constitutionality of the SDF
except for the Japanese Communist Party and other small left parties.
With regard to Japanese case law, the Supreme Court avoided an 
opportunity to examine the constitutionality of the Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty in 1959 in the Sunagawa case, adopting the same idea as the 
“political question doctrine” in American constitutional theory or “act de 
21 Sam Perlo-Freeman et al., Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2015, SIPRI FACT SHEET
(April 2016), http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1604.pdf.
22 Hideo Sanda, Director General, Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Answer before the Budget 
Committee of the House of Councillors (Apr. 3, 1978).
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gouvernement” in French legal theory, where Administrative Courts 
avoid examining legality of a certain kind of presidential acts and 
diplomatic acts of government whose nature is political to a high 
degree.23 In the US, political question doctrine might be invoked, for 
example if a judicial intervention causes a disrespect for other branches 
of government.24 In 1952, a JSP leader had brought a constitutional 
litigation concerning the Constitution directly before the high court, in the 
absence of any case or controversy.  The Japanese Supreme Court 
declined to examine the constitutionality of the “National Police 
Reserve,” on the grounds that the judges’ power to exercise judicial 
review over the constitutionality of a state act is based on the American 
model that had been established through case law in the United States
where existence of a case or a controversy is a necessary condition for 
judicial examination of constitutionality.25 In fact, the Japanese 
Supreme Court has yet to definitively rule on the SDF’s constitutionality
under a certain influence of the political question doctrine. Although one 
judgment out of the Sapporo District Court in 1973, the Naganuma
case,26 declared the SDF unconstitutional, the Supreme Court invalidated 
the decision in September of 1982,27 concluding that the plaintiffs no 
longer had standing to sue.
Public opinion concerning the presence of the SDF is
contradictory. On one hand, a majority considers that the existence of 
the SDF is necessary for national defense and to provide aid to victims of 
disasters.28 But this same majority has long been against the deletion of 
paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Constitution.29 As for legal doctrine, the 
majority of constitutional scholars take the view that the SDF is 
23 Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, 13 Keishu 3225; See MILHAUPT ET AL., supra note 
8, at 230.
24 E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918);
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). According to the US political question doctrine, the 
Supreme Court does not examine cases which deal directly with issues that Constitution makes 
responsible exclusively the other branches of government.
25 Saikǀ6DLEDQVKR [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 8, 1952, 6 MINSHU 783.
26 Sapporo District Court, Sept. 7, 1973, HANREI JIHO, no 712, 249; See MILHAUPT ET AL., supra
note 8, at 239.
27 Saikǀ6DLEDQVKR [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 9, 1982, 36 MINSHU 1679. 
28 A public opinion survey on SDF and issues of national defense taken by the Cabinet in 
January 2015 indicate that 29.9% represent an opinion for reinforcing SDF and 59.2% an opinion for 
maintaining current level of faculties, see "Jieitai/Boueimondai Ni Kansuru Yoronchousa" No 
Gaiyou [Summary on "Public Opinion Poll on Self-Defense Forces/Defense Problem"], 
http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/gairyaku.pdf (Japan).   
29 See Yoron Chousa: Kenpou 9 Jou, Kaisei Hantai 52% "Kenpou Kaisei" Ha Kikkou [Public 
Opinion Poll: Article 9 of the Constitution, 52% disagrees "Constitutional Reform" competition 
remains], MAINICHI SHINBUN (May 3, 2016) http://mainichi.jp/articles/20160503/k00/00e/010/121000c
(Japan) (A public opinion poll taken by a Newspaper Mainichi Shinbun shows 52% of people are 
against any amendment of Article 9).  
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unconstitutional, respecting the letter of the Constitution, a position that is 
explained further in Section IV C.
Despite the gradual development of the SDF, Article 9 has exerted 
a considerable, concrete impact on Japanese military policy since World 
War II. Indeed, the existence of the pacifist Article and movements to 
safeguard the Constitution prevented a total and radical remilitarization of 
postwar Japan. If the article had been removed, the four pacifist policies
adopted by successive conservative governments would never have 
existed. These policies are:
(1) “Three principles on weapons exports” (1967),30 under which 
Japan declared it would not export weapons to communist 
governments, to countries designated by the United Nations, and to
countries in international conflict or at risk of being so
(2) “Three non-nuclear principles” (1967),31 under which Japan 
adopts the following three prohibitions: No possession, no 
production and no permitted introduction onto Japanese territory of 
nuclear weapons
(3) Limitation of military budgets to 1% of GNP (1976–1986)32
(4) No re-introduction of a conscription system (1980)33
Article 9 prevented the Japanese defense industry from growing as 
much as in Western countries, or as it had in Japan before the World War
II. The three non-nuclear principles were motivated by the “nuclear 
allergy” among contemporary Japanese people. As a matter of fact, it is 
widely believed that the third non-nuclear principle has been violated by 
the US military. According to an official explanation from the Japanese 
government, when the U.S. wants to introduce nuclear weapons into
Japanese territory, it must notify the Japanese government for 
consultation. Because the United States has never provided such notice, 
so goes the theory, we must conclude that nuclear weapons have not been
introduced into Japanese territory. However, the U.S. military keeps its 
disposition, movement, and removal of nuclear weapons totally secret.34
30 Prime Minister Takeo Miki, Answer before the Budget Committee of the House of 
Representatives (Feb. 27, 1976).
31 Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, Policy speech before the House of Representatives (Jan. 30, 
1968).
32 Cabinet Decision by the Miki Cabinet, Nov. 5, 1976. 
33 Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Written Answer to House of Councillors (Aug. 15, 1980).
34 Yasufumi Okadome, Hikaku 3 gensoku to kaku mituyaku kyougi [Three Non-nuclear 
Principles and Consultations on the Secret Nuclear Deal] Rippo to chosa no. 309 2010 at 101; Hans 
Kristensen, Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella, NAUTILUS INSTITUTE (June 2016),
http://www.nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Japan-Under-the-US-Nuclear-Umbrella.pdf.
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Thus, Tokyo has no way to confirm or deny the existence or introduction 
of nuclear weapons onto its territory. 
B. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau and Its Role
 
The Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) was formed in 1885, four 
years before the establishment of the Meiji Imperial Constitution.
Modeled on the French Conseil d’État, the CLB was created as a part of 
the modernization of governmental and administrative organizations that 
included the creation of the Cabinet of Ministers as its most important 
component. Four years later, administrative justice functions were
vested in an Administrative Court. Thus, the CLB became a pure organ 
of legal counsel and of examination of government bills, orders, and 
treaties. After being moved under the Ministry of Justice for the period 
from 1945 to 1952, this organ attached to the Cabinet again. The CLB
today primarily fulfills two very important functions for the rule of law: it 
advises Cabinet members on drafting legislation to be proposed to the 
Diet (opinion-giving work), and it acts as legal counsel for the Cabinet by 
examining bills, orders and treaties (examination work). It also presents 
opinions on legal matters to the Prime Minister and other Cabinet 
Ministers. It is a state organ that is authoritative in the Japanese 
bureaucracy. It is noteworthy that in part as a result of the rigorous 
examination of bills by the CLB, the number of laws declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court is extremely small–currently only 
ten.35
The CLB’s Director General shall, as a legal adviser to the Cabinet, 
assume the role of replying on behalf of the Cabinet to the legal questions 
raised by Diet members. The CLB's mission is to unify legal 
interpretations concerning governmental and administrative activities to 
ensure the appropriate and consistent implementation of laws and 
ordinances.36 This mission is not only to unify interpretations among 
ministries, but also those of successive governments, so as not to cause 
any instability or any legal disorder and thereby to maintain the 
coherence of government activities despite changes of government. The 
CLB’s function applies similarly to constitutional questions. Without 
unification of constitutional interpretation within the government, bills
cannot be drafted. A posteriori control of the constitutionality of all acts 
of state can be exercised by judicial review, but governmental
35 Shigeru Yamaguchi, Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Remarks to the Constitution 
Research Council of the House of Representatives (May 15, 2003).
36 See official website of the CLB at About the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, CABINET 
LEGISLATION BUREAU, http://www.clb.go.jp/english/about.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
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constitutional interpretations must be checked a priori and unified by the 
CLB.
C. Interpretation of Article 9 by the Government and the CLB
 
To remilitarize Japan in sharp contradiction with the pacifist 
Article of the Constitution, the government and CLB have presented 
many strained and acrobatic constitutional interpretations as we see 
below. They have interpreted the organization of the military and other 
activities as remaining within the confines of the Constitution. For 
example, on December 22, 1954, the Director of the Defense Agency 
stated that Article 9 does not prevent Japan from defending itself, 
although Japan has renounced war through this Article of the 
Constitution.37 The government introduced three conditions to 
exercising the right of self-defense under the Constitution: (1) if there is 
an attack both pressing and illegal in Japan, (2) there is no other 
appropriate means of defense, and (3) military force that Japan would 
exercise should be confined to the necessary minimum. The 
government repeatedly confirmed such conditions in the Diet.38
The CLB has clarified the legal meanings of the constitutional 
provisions concerning military activities. In 1965, the Director General 
of the CLB provided a definition of the term “civilians” as used in 
paragraph 2 of Article 66.39 He explained, “The Prime Minister and 
other Ministers of State must be civilians. By this government's 
constitutional interpretation change in 1954, the CLB has prohibited an 
active member of the SDF from becoming a minister.”40 In 1978, the
Director General presented the constitutional interpretation stating that 
the possession of nuclear weapons is possible even under the current 
Constitution,41 and in 1980, he noted that the introduction of a 
conscription system is prohibited constitutionally.42 A hypothetical 
legal question has arisen in which Japan would send SDF troops to
37 Seiichi Omura, Director of Defense Agency, Answer before the Budget Committee of the 
House of Representatives (Dec. 22, 1954).
38 Masami Takatsuji, Director General, Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Answer before the Budget 
Committee of the House of Councillors (Mar. 31, 1969); Masami Takatsuji, Director General, Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau, Answer before the Cabinet Committee of the House of Councillors (May 12, 
1972); Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, Answer before the House of Councillors (Sept. 23, 1973).
39 KENPƿ, art. 66, para. 2 (Japan) (“The Cabinet shall consist of the Prime Minister, who shall be 
its head, and other Ministers of State, as provided for by law.”).
40 Masami Takatsuji, Director General, Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Answer before the Budget 
Committee of the House of Representatives (May 31, 1965).
41 Hideo Mano, Director General, Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Answer before the Budget
Committee of the House of Councillors (Apr. 3, 1978).
42 Reijiro Tsunoda, Director General, Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Answer before the Budget 
Committee of the House of Representatives, Feb. 16, 1981.
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participate in a UN army. No such army has been established, but it 
could be created under Article 47 and 48 of the UN Charter in the future. 
In 1980, however, the government rejected this possibility officially,
arguing that if such a UN army should exercise military force to carry out 
its mission, then the participation of troops from the SDF would not be 
permitted under the current Constitution.43
Since the First Gulf War in 1991, under U.S. diplomatic pressure,
the LDP government has wanted Japan to contribute more to the 
international community not only financially, but also in providing
soldiers, doctors, and humanitarian aid, etc. In 1992, the Diet passed a 
controversial Act allowing cooperation to maintain peacekeeping
operations of the UN. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks in New York, on October 29, 2001, a new Act was passed to 
strengthen Japan’s cooperation as part of the international community.
The Act concerned the Special Measures related to the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. This Act allowed Japan to 
send SDF troops to engage in activities to support foreign military and 
humanitarian activities not only within Japan but also on the high seas 
and in foreign territory (with the consent of that country). To justify 
sending troops to Iraq in 2003, the government and CLB invented a very 
artificial distinction between “combat area” and “non-combat area” in a 
country at war. According to the government's interpretation, the 
Constitution prohibits sending troops only into a “combat region” (which 
would then require prior approval of the Diet).44 In addition, the 
Government stated that land transportation of weapons is prohibited even 
in a “non-combat area.” Many constitutional scholars criticized harshly 
the distinction between a “combat area” and a “non-combat area”
elaborated by the CLB on the ground that such a distinction is only a pure 
abstract or notional concept, namely sophism. To justify this 
distinction, however, the Prime Minister at the time, Junichiro Koizumi,
appealed to the spirit of international understanding, citing the following 
sentence of the Preamble of the Constitution: “We desire to occupy an 
honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of 
peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and 
intolerance for all time from the earth.”45
43 Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Written Answer to House of Councillors (Oct. 28, 1980).
44 Osamu Akiyama, Director General, Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Answer before the Budget 
Committee of the House of Representatives (Feb. 13, 2004); Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Written 
Answer to House of Councillors (Aug. 10, 2004).
45 K(13ƿ, pmbl.; Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Remarks at a press conference (Sept. 19, 
2001).
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Thus, as we have seen above, we can say that successive 
governments tried to justify constitutionality of more and more expanding 
military activities of SDF to responding to international pressures.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CRISIS AND THE ISSUE OF THE RIGHT OF 
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE
A. “Impermissible” Interpretation Established by the CLB 
 
In 2013, the Abe Cabinet determined it would be politically 
difficult to attempt a constitutional amendment of Article 9 through an
amendment of procedure of constitutional amendment stipulated by 
Article 96, and therefore decided to modify the interpretation disallowing 
the right of collective self-defense developed by the CLB since 1981. 
On May 29, 1981, in response to a question asked by a member of 
the LDP in the House of Representatives, the LDP government clearly 
formulated its negative constitutional interpretation on the issue of a right 
of collective self-defense as follows:
Under international law, it is understood that a sovereign state has the 
right of collective self-defense, that is to say, the right to prevent a 
military attack on a foreign country that maintains a close relationship 
with it, even though it is not directly attacked. Japan, as a sovereign 
state, has the natural right of collective self-defense defined as such. 
According to our interpretation of Article 9, the exercise of the right 
of self-defense permitted by it must be limited to the minimum 
necessary to defend our country. Therefore, an exercise of 
collective self-defense right is not permitted under the Constitution 
since it exceeds such a limit.46
On February 22, 1983, the Director General of the CLB Reijiro 
Tsunoda himself admitted to the Budget Committee of the House of 
Representatives that if Japan would like to exercise the right of collective 
self-defense under the current Constitution, it must necessarily resort to a 
constitutional amendment. Thus, the interpretation that the right of 
collective self-defense was not permissible under Article 9 was 
established, and dominated for more than 30 years until 2014.
However, since the 1990s the CLB has been criticized more and 
more violently by radical conservatives because they believe the 
interpretations of Article 9 presented by the CLB are restricting the 
46 Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Written Answer to House of Councillors (May 29, 1981).
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development of activities of the SDF too severely. It is notable that the 
rise among conservatives of opinion favorable to the introduction of a 
Constitutional Court of the European type, able to judge constitutional 
limits of military activities, was parallel to this increasing criticism of the 
CLB. They were thinking it would be better to examine the 
constitutionality of legislations concerning military activities by a 
Constitutional Court where judges could be nominated on political 
reasons than to let the CLB examine it as of now, where its bureaucratic 
legal control of military activities could not be changed with ease by 
external political powers. 
On August 8 2013, Abe appointed Ichiro Komatsu as the new 
Director General of the CLB. Komatsu,47 who was a professional 
diplomat, an expert in international law, and the former Japanese 
Ambassador to France, was a perfect stranger to the CLB.48 In fact, he 
was thrust into what had been an honorable bastion of 
government-patronized legists. Although Komatsu’s appointment 
followed statutory procedure, it was not in accordance with the rotation 
practice dating back to 1946.49 Traditionally, the Deputy Director 
General of the CLB automatically assumed the position of Director 
General upon the resignation of his predecessor. Komatsu was expected 
to have significant advisory power to the CLB. As we will see below, 
certainly the CLB will change the constitutional interpretation of the 
Article 9 on the right of collective self-defense after the nomination of 
Komatsu as the Director General of the CLB. It is noteworthy that the 
Japanese government has always followed the advisory opinions of the 
CLB. Thus, the Abe Cabinet thought, if this customary rule is always to
be respected, the advisory opinion should be changed. 
B. The Change of the Constitutional Interpretation of Article 9 and 
Reactions
 
After working with the CLB, whose Director General had until 
recently been an outsider diplomat, on July 1, 2014, the Cabinet meeting 
47 He had published a textbook on international law before his nomination as the Director 
General of the CLB, see ICHIRO KOMATSU, JISSEN KOKUSAIHO, PRACTICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2011). After his death on June 23, 2014, his academic works on international law were collected and 
published, see ICHIRO KOMATSU, KOKUSAIHO JISSEN RONSHU, COLLECTED WORKS ON PRACTICAL 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015).
48 He had to resign from the post because of illness on May 16, 2014. 
49 1DLNDNXKǀVHLN\RNXVHFFKLKǀ[Enforcement Order of CLB Establishment Law], Law No. 252
of 1952, art. 2, para. 1.
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announced a change in the governmental constitutional interpretation of 
Article 9:50
Under such recognition and as a result of careful examination in 
light of the current security environment, the Government has 
reached a conclusion that not only when an armed attack against 
Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign 
country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a 
result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to 
fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of 
happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available 
to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its 
people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be 
interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for 
self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s 
view to date.51
It is clear that this change of the government’s interpretation of 
Article 9 widens the practical scope of the right of self-defense. The right 
to self-defense is widened under this interpretation because even if there 
is no direct military attack against Japan, Japan is constitutionally able to 
use the minimum necessary force when the strict conditions of the armed 
attack on the foreign country threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear 
danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit 
of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to 
repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people are 
satisfied. Criticism that “this alteration of constitutional interpretation by 
the Abe Cabinet qualifies as a violation of constitutionalism” widely and 
rapidly spread in influential media, constitutional academia,52 the Japan 
Federation of Bar Associations,53 and the overwhelming majority of the 
pacific movements. This widespread criticism acted to oppose the 
interpretation by the CLB. It should be noted that former Director 
50 At the time of the actual change in interpretation of Article 9, Komatsu was no longer the 
Director General of the CLB because of disease, and had been succeeded by Yusuke Yokobatake, 
former Deputy Director General of the CLB. If he had not accepted the new constitutional 
interpretation of Article 9, probably another outsider of the CLB would have been nominated as the 
Director General. 
51 Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure 
Japan’s Survival and Protect its People (July 1, 2014) 7–8, CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU,
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/decisions/2014/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2014/07/03/anpohosei_eng.pdf. 
52 On June 11, Asahi Shinbun reported that only 1.6% of 122 Japanese constitutional scholars 
appreciated this bill as constitutional.
53 Susumu Murakoshi, Statement Opposing the Bills to Revise National Security Policy, JAPAN 
FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS (May 14, 2015), http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/statements/year/201
5/150514.html. 
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Generals of the CLB54 have publicly criticized this change, always 
coming from the perspective of constitutionalism, and former Chief 
Justice Yamaguchi of the Supreme Court55 expressed the same opinion. 
Various political movements were also encouraged by this critical 
constitutional argument. This groundswell of criticism is why the Abe 
government had a difficult time persuading both Houses of the Diet to 
adopt a controversial security-related bill in 2015, which was based on 
the new constitutional interpretation regarding the right of collective 
self-defense.56
Admittedly, this criticism within the context of constitutionalism 
has been very influential politically. Despite one’s political position 
towards the military-diplomatic policy of the Abe government, we ask if 
this change in the government’s constitutional interpretation regarding the 
right of collective self-defense is a constitutional crisis.  Therefore, we 
wonder if it is theoretically appropriate to argue that this change in the 
government leads to a crisis of constitutionalism. To examine this 
question, we must review the constitutional doctrinal history of the 
pacifist Article. 
C. The Doctrinal History of Article 9
 
Since the establishment of the “National Police Reserve” in 1950, 
the vast majority of constitutional scholars have held the view that the 
policy of remilitarization continuously pursued by conservative
politicians is unconstitutional. Why have they viewed remilitarization 
as unconstitutional? Japanese representative constitutional doctrine 
after the World War II was built under Hans Kelsen’s theoretical 
influence on hierarchy of laws according to the following reasoning: legal 
54 Masasuke Omori, Former Director General, Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Opinion presented at 
the Peace and Security Special Committee of the House of Councillors (Sep. 9, 2015) (Director 
General from January 1996 to August 1999); Masahiro Sakata, Former Director General, Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau, Opinion presented at the Peace and Security Special Committee of the House of 
Councillors (June 22, 2015) (Director General from August 2004 to September 2006); Reiichi 
Miyazaki, Former Director General, Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Opinion presented at the Peace and 
Security Special Committee of the House of Councillors (May15, 2014) (Director General from 
September 2006 to January 2010).
55 Opinion presented by former Chief Justice Shigeru Yamaguchi in an interview with Asahi 
Shinbun, see Ex-Supreme Court chief justice raps Abe’s security reforms, THE JAPAN TIMES (Sep. 4,
2015),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/04/national/politics-diplomacy/ex-supreme-court-chief-justi
ce-raps-abes-security-reforms/#.WC1ljuErKt8.
56 Tomohiro Osaki, Thousands protest Abe, security bills at Diet rally, THE JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 
30, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/30/national/thousands-protest-abe-security-bills-
diet-rally/#.V0edKJOLR-U (reporting that organizers stated 120.000 people gathered around the Diet 
Building on Aug. 30, 2015).
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norms fix a frame.57 This frame exists objectively and it is verifiable
scientifically. Legal actors have several possible interpretations within 
this frame. As interpreters of the legal norm, the actors make voluntary 
choices between different possibilities and create the law. Thus, one can 
distinguish “authentic interpretation” from “false interpretation”
scientifically and objectively. By adopting this conception of the act of 
interpretation, the majority of Japanese constitutional scholarship has 
drawn the inference that any interpretation that would justify
constitutionality of SDF is outside of the frame fixed by Article 9. They 
took a very critical position with regard to the government’s
interpretation of Article 9 and concluded that it was a “false 
interpretation.” Therefore, the CLB was criticized as an organ that used 
sophistry and contributed to the “false interpretation” of Article 9. The 
CLB was also the object of fierce criticism from citizens concerned with
preserving Japanese pacifism. But despite such criticism, rearmament 
of Japan was completed and strengthened gradually through many duly 
established laws and decrees concerning the SDF and the Defense
Agency.58
In opposition to rearmament, dissenting views were expressed 
strongly by constitutional scholarship and in the media. The media 
characterized the political and legal phenomenon around Article 9 as
constitutional amendment by interpretation.59 It means to effect de facto
constitutional changes through an interpretation of the existing 
Constitution that contradicts the constitution’s meaning. In other words, 
a policy objective is achieved through a change in constitutional 
interpretation without following the procedure prescribed for
constitutional amendment, or without touching any constitutional text in 
question. Thus, it has become very common among those who are 
pro-constitution progressives to criticize successive governments’
constitutional policies as a constitutional hollowing out through 
constitutional amendment by interpretation.
Parallel to the theory of “amendment by interpretation” is a 
doctrinal explanation inspired by the theory of constitutional mutation 
(Verfassungswandlung) presented by the great German public law
theoretician, Georg Jellinek. His theory describes a “constitutional 
57 See generally SHIRO KIYOMIYA, KOKKA SAYO NO RIRON [THEORY OF STATE FUNCTIONS]
(1968).
58 About Ministry, JAPAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/about/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2016). The Defense Agency has been the Ministry of Defense since January of 2007.
59 See generally OSAMU WATANABE, NIHONKOKU KENPO ‘KAISEI’ SHI [HISTORY OF IDEOLOGY OF 
JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM] (1987). 
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modification that formally leaves the texts unchanged, but is produced by 
the facts, which must not be accompanied by the intention or 
consciousness of such a change.”60 Here, “the facts” would be the 
existence of the SDF and the Japanese Defense Agency produced by the 
numerous unconstitutional laws and ordinances that legally support their
existence and operation. Therefore, the question is whether Japanese 
constitutional law has been changed by “constitutional amendment by 
interpretation.”
Similarly, in the 1980s, constitutionalist, Kiminobu Hashimoto, 
presented theories inspired by the theory of constitutional mutation.61
According to him, until the 1980s, Japanese constitutional doctrine had 
come to grips with the practical meaning of Article 9, namely the total 
negation of remilitarization. However, with the radical changes of the 
international environment and the international status of Japan, he 
affirmed it was necessary to change Japan’s interpretation of Article 9. 
The Japanese people consequently condoned establishment of military 
forces for national defense, leading to a transformation in the meaning of 
Article 9. Therefore, the question is whether Japanese constitutional law 
has been changed by “constitutional amendment by interpretation.”
However, a majority of constitutionalists in Japan have rejected the 
theory of “constitutional mutation” or that of “constitutional convention”
contra legem (“against the law”), doubting its compatibility with the 
existence of a written and rigid constitution. In fact, they have never 
accepted that while the will of the nation is principally expressed in
constitutional text, it can manifest also through custom or stabilized 
accomplished fact. Under this theory, we would have to negate that a 
constitutional custom can change the constitutional text. We have to 
qualify that the SDF was created undoubtedly by the anti-constitutionalist
means, unlike the postwar German remilitarization process where the 
constitution was changed formally by using amendment procedure to 
justify a postwar remilitarization.
Another approach explaining the nature of the SDF appeared at 
that time, which defined the SDF as unconstitutional but legal (the 
“unconstitutional-legal-theory”).62 This theory states that while the SDF
remains unconstitutional, we must face the reality that it existed and 
60 See GEORG JELINEK, VERFASSUNGSÄNDERUNG UND VERFASSUNGSWANDLUNG: EINE 
STAATSRECHTLICH-POLITISCHE ABHANDLUNG, (O. Haring ed., 1906).
61 See KIMINOBU HASHIMOTO, KOHO NO KAISHAKU [INTERPRETATION OF PUBLIC LAW] (1987).
62 See NAOKI KOBAYASHI, KENPO DAI 9 JO [ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONSTITUTION] (1982). 
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functioned as a national army for more than twenty years with the legal 
base founded by numerous duly established laws and decrees. However, 
there was not any supporter of this theory.
Overall, the prevalent constitutional doctrine at that time and even 
until very recently, including scholars who rejected the “constitutional 
mutation” theory and proponents of the “unconstitutional-legal-theory,”
was critical of the government’s interpretation of Article 9. The 
government seemed too tolerant in accepting a reality obviously 
inconsistent with the constitutional text. According to the dominant 
constitutional doctrine, “constitutional amendment by interpretation” and 
“constitutional mutation” were no more than a violation of 
constitutionalism. Constitutional doctrines that supported the 
government's interpretation on the pacifist Article asserting its 
compatibility with SDF were very rare.
D. Theoretical Reflection on Current Trends of Constitutional 
Doctrine
 
As noted, on July 1, 2014, the Abe Cabinet decided to change the 
government's interpretation of Article 9 so that Japan would be able to 
exercise the right of collective self-defense constitutionally. Is this a 
constitutional policy that can be carried out without any constitutional 
amendment? It seems that the current majority of Japanese 
constitutional scholars now affirm emphatically that this change cannot 
be implemented without recourse to the procedure for a constitutional 
amendment stipulated by Article 96 from the procedural point of view.
According to this doctrine, the rule of law in Japan is guaranteed by the 
stability of the government's interpretation of the Constitution. That 
interpretation must be the consequence of the political balance of power, 
meaning the conflicts, tensions, and deliberations in the Diet since the 
establishment of SDF between successive governments and opposition 
parties. We should respect this interpretation as the result of legal and 
political balance.63 In addition, the majority view argues that the 
interpretation presented by successive governments prior to Abe and 
previously by the CLB coincides well with the current opinion of 
Japanese citizens today. According to this thesis, a kind of mutual 
agreement between the major actors had been established based on a 
restrictive interpretation. Indeed, efforts by the SDF to offer aid to 
63 E.g., Shigeru Minamino, Kinjite deha nakute seikohowo, jo yori ri wo [Frontal Attack Rather 
than Forbidden Technique, Reason than Emotion], in SHUDANTEKI JIEIKEN NO NANIGA MONADIKA 89,
89 (Yasuhiro Okudaira & Jiro Yamaguchi eds., 2014).
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victims of natural disasters are highly appreciated by the people, like 
when the SDF responded to the great earthquake on March 11, 2011.
The majority of the public, however, does not desire an expansion of the 
scope of military activities of the SDF.64
It is very interesting to note that so far we find no controversy 
between the two opposing theoretical positions on the change of 
interpretation of the Article 9. Belonging politically to the same camp, 
the two currents support different strategies to prevent a 
constitutionalization of an exercise of the right of collective self-defense: 
the opposition from the procedural point of view or the substantive point 
of view. 
What is the theoretical premise of the doctrine on Article 9 of the 
current majority of Japanese constitutional scholars who remark a 
necessity to resort to constitutional amendment? Theoretically, 
following this doctrine, the CLB’s interpretation is described as having a 
particular role in the hierarchy of laws in the state. This doctrine does
not hold that the CLB’s interpretation has become a legal standard at the 
constitutional level, but it would be above ordinary law, which the 
Legislature can legally abolish or modify at any time without a 
constitutional amendment. The CLB’s interpretation therefore falls 
somewhere in between on the hierarchy. Because the interpretation has 
an effect similar to that of a constitutional amendment, but is not 
constitutional without an amendment, it is a “semi-constitutional” norm 
or “quasi-constitutional” norm contra legem. It is normatively stronger 
than the constitutional convention, since it is a purely political norm
without any judicial sanction to an act of violation although it is a rule for 
application. According to my understanding such a way of thinking on 
the “semi-constitutional” norm is particular to Japanese constitutionalism.
This is due to the fact that Japan has been able to rearm gradually but
steadily without resorting to constitutional amendment. In this respect, 
Japan is a very unique country in the world. Further, Japan’s ability to 
rearm without a constitutional amendment has produced another 
particularity in terms of the hierarchy of laws in the state to assert a 
“semi-constitutional” norm or “quasi-constitutional” norm contra legem.
64 E.g., A recent public opinion poll by Asahi Shinbun on May 14–15 , 2015 indicates that 52% 
of people are against any expansion of the scope of oversee activities, while 33% of people stand for 
it, see Asahi Shimbun Regular Public Opinion Poll, Maureen and Mike Mansfield, 
http://mansfieldfdn.org/program/research-education-and-communication/asian-opinion-poll-database/
asahi-shimbun-regular-public-opinion-poll-05192015/ Foundation. 
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In addition to the previous doctrine, there is another influential 
constitutional one. Unlike the previous one, this doctrine supports a 
radical pacifism without any army. According to this doctrine, the 
pacifism of the Japanese Constitution is based on the radical idea that the 
existence of an army, is, by definition, against the interest of the people. 
It is noteworthy that in Japan, despite the fundamental difference between 
the pre-War and post-War constitutions, the dominant constitutional 
doctrine always presupposes theoretical legal boundaries of constitutional 
amendment both before and after the World War II. All the more 
impressive is that beyond the methodological differences of each 
constitutionalist, there is a common dominant theme, derived from 
German public law theorist, Carl Schmitt that envisages the Constitution 
as the fundamental decision of political entity.65 By linking this way of 
thinking and a kind of radical pacifism, this doctrine argues that the 
amendment of paragraph 2 of Article 9 is impossible normatively because 
it would exceed a limit on the ability to constitutionally amend the 
Constitution. According to this opinion, paragraph 2 of Article 9 is the 
core and the identity of the current Constitution. Therefore, it is 
theoretically impossible to resort to a constitutional amendment in order 
to overcome the constitutional interpretation by the CLB. The Japanese 
people must never alter Article 9 to permit rearmament. If the Japanese 
people abolished paragraph 2 of Article 9 through constitutional 
amendment, the result would be a violation of constitutionalism. 
Moreover, constitutional scholars who agree with this argument are 
convinced that to continue to affirm the unconstitutionality of the SDF is
the best way, politically, to limit expansion of the SDF, because such an
interpretation is capable of depriving the SDF of complete legitimacy.
In contrast, the new current I presented above that requires a 
constitutional amendment in place of changing the government’s
interpretation of Article 9, and reduces the problem simply to a choice of 
procedure to be adopted. They affirm that if the government wants to 
change the interpretation of Article 9, it is necessary to use the 
constitutional amendment procedure of Article 96; otherwise the 
government has to give up on the change of its interpretation.
Furthermore, it is remarkable that the percentage of constitutional 
scholars who support the pre-July, 2014 governmental interpretation of
Article 9 and admit the constitutionality of Japan’s right of individual 
self-defense has been gradually increasing, and dramatically so with the 
65 CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 150 (2008). 
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passage of time. We can qualify this doctrinal phenomenon as a variant 
of the theory of constitutional mutation (Verfassungswandlung).
It is noteworthy that the situation we have mentioned where very 
different interpretations of the Article are presented including the new 
governmental interpretation clarifies the current nature of the forum for
discussion around the interpretation of Article 9. This constitutional 
forum is very different from an ordinary legal forum of the intellectual
community composed of legal specialists. In the current constitutional 
forum, political considerations overwhelmingly precede legal logic.
We may question whether the procedure-oriented current is 
justifiable theoretically, even if the political intention that motivates it is
understandable. It must be said that the “semi-constitutional” or 
“quasi-constitutional” norm is extremely difficult to sustain theoretically.
One possibility is that the decision of the Abe Government has expanded 
the frame originally established by Article 9. Based on a kind of theory 
of “constitutional mutation,” the fundamental change in 2014 in the legal 
environment surrounding postwar constitutional pacifism may change the 
meaning of Article 9 for many constitutional scholars to allow an exercise 
of the constitutional right of individual self-defense; that is to say, put it
within the frame of Article 9. The evocation of this interpretation would 
be able to justify very effectively the use of force by the SDF. On the 
contrary, an exercise of the right of collective self-defense would still 
remain outside the frame set by Article 9. If this is the case, to admit the 
right of collective self-defense constitutionally, we would have to amend 
the pacifist Article.
We must remark that this solution contains a fundamental 
structural transformation of the argument of interpretation. Relying on 
the “theory of constitutional mutation” necessarily leads to a dynamic 
vision of the act of interpretation. If one day in the future a government 
or the CLB were to declare a new constitutional interpretation of Article 
9, which set out much more lenient conditions for the exercise of the right
of collective self-defense than those in the 2014 decision of the Abe
Government, what criteria should be adopted to evaluate this new
interpretation? Politically, it is quite likely that the interpretation of the 
CLB may change again, under pressure from the ruling party. We must 
say that according to this doctrine, ultimately, a frame fixed by the 
constitutional text does not exist. The outer frame is flexible, supple and 
changeable over time. Probably the continuity and stability of an 
interpretation and the degree of consensus among citizens would make 
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such an interpretation a “semi-constitutional” or “quasi-constitutional” 
norm.
According to our understanding, it is pertinent to criticize the new 
interpretation of Article 9 as lacking in merit because of a lack of 
persuasiveness and a misunderstanding of the recent international security 
environment in place of resorting to the problem of constitutionalism as 
we saw above.
V. CONCLUSION
 
A French constitutional law scholar of the University of Paris I,
Dominique Rousseau, referring to “hermeneutic thinking,” describes 
interpretation as “a continuous act of relationship,” overcoming the 
opposition between interpretation as an “act of knowledge” and an “act of 
will.”66 He explains that 
[T]he text exists before the interpretation and it remains after. 
The interpretation is intended to represent the meaning of the text, 
to deliver its secret, but the mystery may never be completely lifted 
as a text remains forever inexhaustible. Inexhaustible does not 
mean that the constructed meaning does not exhaust the text: there 
is only a moment in the history of text that continues to live and 
therefore to become the support for other interpretations later.67
The new trend in Japanese constitutional law since 2014 concerning the 
pacifist Article corresponds to the definition of the interpretation given by 
Dominique Rousseau. In fact, both of the new governmental 
interpretation of Article 9 and the new procedural approach interpretation 
are very far from the original meaning of Article 9. 
Nevertheless, we should note an important difference. Even 
though constitutionalists of this new trend are very much aware that the 
act of interpretation is essentially a subjective act of will based on 
political preference, they tend to state that the interpretation of the CLB
up until 2014 was the only authentic and scientifically convincing 
interpretation as we saw above in Section III Part D. Such a behavior 
corresponds exactly to the expectation of the mass media in its desire to
know and report only one authentic constitutional interpretation on this 
66 DOMINIQUE ROUSSEAU, DROIT DU CONTENTIEUX CONSTITUTIONNEL 145–46 (9th ed. 2010).
67  Id.  
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issue. The mass media tends to believe or pretends to believe that there 
is only one authentic and scientifically convincing constitutional 
interpretation. The procedural approach to the issue of constitutionality 
of the right of collective self-defense meets such an expectation perfectly.
In fact, contemporary Japanese constitutional law scholars’ attitude 
is mainly due to their socio-political role in the public space.68 Indeed, 
in Japan as well as in many other countries, the activities of constitutional 
law professors are not limited to university campuses or to academic 
activities. Although constitutional law professors do research in their 
field, teach their students at the university and attend national and 
international academic conferences, alongside these scientific and 
educational activities, it is not unusual for them to give expression in 
public spaces as constitutional law specialists. Their opinions may 
possibly have a large influence on public opinion regarding various legal, 
political, and social topics. This tradition dates from the 19th century at 
the very birth of the Japanese constitutional law academia. Accordingly,
in order not to risk weakening the sociopolitical practical effect of their 
doctrines, constitutionalists always present their interpretations as “the 
only authentic interpretation” in the public space, avoiding objective 
explanation of the nature of the act of interpretation. This is essentially 
a “political position” rather than a “pure legal position” or a “position as a 
historian or a sociologist.”69
Article 9 is popularly known as “the pacifist Article,” and a large 
part of Japanese opinion tends to consider military and defense policy 
that is in tension with Article 9 as purely bellicose. Although this
mindset of the post-war Japanese people is very understandable, it makes 
it difficult to discuss dispassionately questions such as how Japan should 
contribute to or cooperate with the international community, including 
military activities. In this situation, I think we must reconsider the 
nature of the normativity of Article 9 and desirable issues for discussion
about the future. It seems to me that it is extremely difficult to affirm a 
clear legal rule and criterion to distinguish a constitutional situation and 
an unconstitutional situation in the field of the interpretation of Article 9.
The interpretation of Article 9 has necessarily evolved over time 
since the establishment of the Constitution; its original meaning of 
68 See Simon Serverin, La Constitution japonaise est-elle fondée sur une légitimité 
charismatique?, 5 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 1311 (2014). 
69 Stéphane Rials, Réflexions sur la notion de coutume constitutionnelle, 189 LA REVUE 
ADMINISTRATIVE 273 (1979).
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realizing a “perfectly demilitarized Japan” was negated quickly and 
totally, although it has nevertheless continued to exert significant 
regulative effects on the militaristic and diplomatic aspects of Japanese 
politics. Thus, as Ronald Dworkin observed in his critique of legal 
positivism, it is better to understand Article 9 as “law as principles” rather 
than as “law as rules.”70 In Japan, Yasuo Hasebe adopted this way of 
thinking for the Article 9 more than 10 years ago.71 As for rules, they 
function in an all or nothing fashion. If Article 9 were a rule, an army 
would be unconstitutional. In terms of principles, norms tend to incline 
towards one direction, and continue to lead in that direction. According 
to this understanding, Article 9 would incline Japan normatively to
remilitarize as little as possible. So, if the government would like to 
strengthen the military power of the SDF or enlarge the scope of activities 
of the SDF, it must present such compelling necessities as a constitutional 
obligation. I think under such a condition it is to be desired that Japan 
discuss reasonably the scope of activities of the SDF through 
distinguishing among the legal-constitutional dimension, national
interest-oriented dimension, and international public interest-oriented 
dimension.
From the point of view of constitutional policy, it seems very wise 
to keep Article 9 in the constitution as “law as principles.” Article 9 as a
principle means that Japan could remilitarize, but would need to limit its 
remilitarization as much as possible. Is that very wise? Generally 
speaking, a military expansion is very difficult to control even in 
democratic countries. Furthermore, we have to remark that Japan is 
unique in at least two ways. First, it made important historic mistakes in 
not controlling its military authorities during World War II, resulting in 
the complete destruction of the pre-war democratic regime. Second, 
contemporary Japanese opinion is still deeply divided in respect to the 
recognition of historical events related to the invasions of countries in 
Asia during World War II. It is worrisome that extreme right-wing 
elements attempting to justify more or less Japan’s pre-war Asia invasion 
have recently increased their influence. Thus, there may be a danger to 
provoke a feeling of tension or fear regarding Japan’s military threat,
especially to China and Russia, and its risk of destabilizing the East Asian 
political and military environment in case a dramatic or sudden Japanese 
military expansion occurs.  Thus, Article 9 has assumed a militarily
70 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (1977).
71 YASUO HASEBE, KENPO TO HEIWA WO TOINAOSU [REQUESTIONING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND 
PEACE] 㸦2004).
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stabilizing function for the East Asian region, and should continue to 
serve that purpose.
In relation to the so-called “Japanese constitutionalism in crisis,”
what is important is to respect the freedom of political expression
guaranteed by the Constitution and a well-functioning democratic process
in order to formulate Japanese military and defense policies based on a 
consensus of the people. If this process functions well, and a 
well-functioning democratic process could involve an interpretation of 
Article 9 allowing collective self-defense, a crisis of constitutionalism in 
Japan can be avoided. On the contrary, in the near future this process 
could exclude such interpretation by establishing a new government 
composed by current opposition parties (Democratic Party, JCP, Social 
Democratic Party etc.) against the current coalition LDP/Komeito, a crisis 
of constitutionalism can also be avoided to reestablish the previous 
constitutional interpretation on the right of collective self-defense.
